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The Syufy Rosetta Stone
Editors' Note: In 1990, United States v. Syufy Enterprises*
grabbed headlines for its style as well as its legal substance.
The reason: Some suspected that Judge Alex Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit worked more than 200 movie titles into the text of
the opinion." Although Judge Kozinski will neither confirm
nor deny the suspicions, a rogue citation to Leonard Maltin's TV
Movies and Video Guide (see note 10) has set many movie buffs
speculating.
We tried our hand at it, and came up with 215 titles,
underlined in the following reproduction of Judge Kozinski's
opinion. Is it all just a big coincidence?
CAUTION: Do not turn the page yet. Go ahead, make
yourself a copy of the Syufy opinion from the Federal Reporter,
get a copy of Maltin's book and see how well you do:
0-50 movies:
50-100:
100-150:
150-200:
200 plus:

Get a life.
Law Geek-but there's hope.
A modern centaur: half lawyer, half movie buff.
Apply for a clerkship with Judge Kozinski now.
Forget the law and get into The Industry-you're a
natural.

OFFICIAL RULES:
Movie titles are judged by the 1989 edition of Maltin's guide.
Only feature films count; no made-for-TV movies or mini-series.
Movie titles have to be exact; no letters may be added or deleted.
Only permissible change: de-capitalization.
Punctuation counts-"ir is not "it . ."and "help" is not "HELP!."
Everything except the headnotes (which are not included since
they are prepared by the printer) is fair game.

Have fun!
*

903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Verdict: Frantic Antitrust Ideas Are Gone with
the Wind, WALL ST. J. May 23, 1990, at A23; Don DeBenedictis, Movie Movie, ABA
J. August 1990, at 20; Appeals Court Blasts US. Monopoly Suit Vs. Syufy,
V A R I ~May
,
10, 1990, at 1; Dick Goldberg, Judge Uses Ruling in Movie Case to
Show What He Reel-ly Knows, L.A. DAILYJ., May 10, 1990, at 1.

**
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United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Syufy Enterprises; Raymond J. Syufy, Defendants-Appellees
NO. 89-15475.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
903 F.2d 659. Argued and Submitted August 14, 1989. Decided
May 9, 1990.
Robert B. Nicholson, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Maxwell M Blecher, Blecher & Collins, Los Angeles,
California, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.
Before Wiggins and Kozinski, Circuit Judges, and
Quackenbush, District Judge*
Kozinski, Circuit Judge:
Suspect that giant film distributors like Columbia,
Paramount and Twentieth Century-Fox had fallen prey to
Raymond Syufy, the canny operator of a chain of Las Vegas,
Nevada, movie theatres, the United States Department of
Justice brought this civil antitrust action to force Syufy to
disgorge the theatres he had purchased in 1982-84 from his
former competitors. The case is unusual in a number of
respects: The Department of Justice concedes that moviegoers
i n Las Vegas suffered no direct injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal transactions; nor does the record reflect
complaints from Syufy's bought-out competitors, as the sales
were made a t fair prices and not precipitated by any monkev
business; and the supposedly oppressed movie companies have
weighed i n on Syufy's side. The Justice Department
nevertheless remains intent on rescuing this platoon of
Goliaths from a single David.
After extensive discovery and an & day trial, the learned
district judge entered comprehensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law, holding for Syufy. He found, inter alia, that
Syufy's actions did not injure competition because there are no
barriers to entry-others could and did enter the market-and
that Syufy therefore did not have the power to control prices or
exclude the competition. While Justice raises a multitude of
issues in its appeal, these key findings of the district court
* The Honorable Justin L. Quackenbush, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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present the greatest hurdle it must overcome.

Gone are the days when a movie ticket cost a dime,
popcorn a nickel and theatres had a single screen: This is the
age of the multiplex. With more than 300 new films released
every year-each potentially the next Batman or E.T.-many
successful theatres today run a different film on each of their
six, twelve or eighteen screens. The multiplex offers something
for evewone: Moviegoers can choose from a wider selection of
films; theatre operators are able to balance profits and losses
from blockbusters and flops, and to reduce manpower by
consolidating concession islands; the producers, of course, like
having the extra screens on which to display their wares.
Raymond Syufy understood the formula well. In 1981, he
entered the Las Vegas market with a splash by opening a sixscreen theatre. Newly constructed and luxuriously furnished, it
put existing facilities to shame. Syufy's entry into the Las
Vegas market caused a stir, precipitating a titanic bidding
war.' Soon, theatres in Las Vegas were paying some of the
highest license fees in the nation, while distributors sat back
and watched the easy money roll in.
It is the nature of free enterprise that fierce, no holds
barred competition will drive out the least effective participants
in the market, providing the most efficient allocation of
productive resources. And so it was in the Las Vegas movie
market in 1982. After a hard fought battle among several

1. Film distributors do not hand
prints for free; they sell exhibition
licenses. These licenses normally spec* a percentage of weekly house receipts,
known as license fees, payable by the theatre owner to the distributor. Where
more than one theatre in a given area volunteers to pay the license fee for a
particular film, the distributor has several options: It can license the film to more
than one theatre in the area; it can award the film to a particular theatre with
which it has an ongoing relationship; or it can let them all bid for exclusive
exhibition rights. Where the distributor adopts the competitive bidding approach, as
virtually all distributors did in Las Vegas prior to October 1984, the high bid
usually includes a guarantee-a minimum fee payable to the distributor even if the
film bombs.
As bidding in Las Vegas grew more fierce, guarantee amounts went over the
top. Too often, the bids were so high that theatre owners ran up substantial
losses. The industry refers to these as busted guarantees, meaning that because
the film did less business than was expected, the theatre was trapped into paying
the higher guarantee amount instead of the percentage of box office it had
negotiated. Occasionally, guarantees in Las Vegas were so high that they exceeded
the gate at a particular theatre.

460 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

contenders, Syufy gained the upper hand. Two of his rivals,
Mann Theatres and Plitt Theatres, saw their future as rocky
and decided to sell out to Syufy. While Mann and Plitt are
major exhibitors nationwide, neither had a large presence i n
Las Vegas. Mann operated two indoor theatres with a total of
three screens; Plitt operated a single theatre with three
screens. Things were relatively quiet until September 1984; in
September, Syufy entered into earnest negotiations with
Cragin Industries, his largest remaining ~ompetitor.~
Cragin
sold out to Syufy midway through October, leaving Roberts
Company, a small exhibitor of mostly second-run films, as
Syufy's only competitor for first-run films in Las Vegas.
It is these three transactions-Syufy's purchases of the
Mann, Plitt and Cragin theatres-that the Justice Department
claims amount to antitrust violation^.^ As government counsel
explained a t oral argument, the thrust of its case is that "you
may not get monopoly power by buying out your competitors."
Tr. of Oral Arg. a t 1.

Competition is the driving force behind our free enterprise
system. Unlike centrally planned economies, where decisions
about production and allocation are made by government
bureaucrats who ostensibly see the big picture and know to &
t h e r i ~ h tthing, capitalism relies on decentralized
planning-millions
of producers and consumers making
hundreds of millions of individual decisions each year-to
determine what and how much will be produced. Competition
plays the key role in this process: It imposes a n essential
discipline on producers and sellers of goods to provide the
consumer with a better product at a lower cost; it drives out
inefficient and marginal producers, releasing resources to
higher-valued uses; it promotes diversity, giving consumers
choices to fit a wide array of personal preferences; it avoids
permanent concentrations of economic power, as even the
2.
Cragin's Redrock Theatre was an 11-screen multiplex. It was sold to Syufy
when the enterprise fell upon hard times because of a dispute between partners
Lucille Cragin and Horst Schmidt.
3.
Specifically, the government's complaint alleges monopolization and/or
attempted monopolization of a part of commerce in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 2 (1988), and substantial lessening of competition by
acquisition within a line of commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. $ 18 (1988).
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largest firm can lose market share to a feistier and hungrier
rival. If, as the metaphor goes, a market economy is governed
by a n invisible hand, competition is surely the brass knuckles
by which it enforces its decisions.
When competition is impaired, producers may be able to
reap monopoly profits, denying consumers many of the benefits
of a free market. It is a simple but important truth, therefore,
that our antitrust laws are designed to protect the integrity of
the market system by assuring that competition reigns freely.
While much has been said and written about the antitrust laws
during the last century of their existence, ultimately the court
must resolve a practical question in every monopolization case:
Is this the type of situation where market forces are likely to
cure the perceived problem within a reasonable period of time?
Or, have barriers been erected to constrain the normal
operation of the market, so that the problem is not likely to be
self-correcting? In the latter situation, it might well be
necessary for a court to correct the market imbalance; in the
former, a court ought to exercise extreme caution because
judicial intervention in a competitive situation can itself upset
the balance of market forces, bringing about the very ills the
antitrust laws were meant to prevent. See R. Coase, The Firm,
The Market, and the Law 117-19 (1988); R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 324-25, 338-39 (3d ed. 1986).
It is with these observations in mind that we turn to the
case before us. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this case
is that the accused monopolist is a relatively tiny regional
entrepreneur while the alleged victims are humongous national
corporations with considerable market power of their own.
While this is not dispositive-it is conceivable that a little big
man may be able to exercise monopoly power locally against
large national entities-chances are it is not without
significance. Common sense suggests, and experience teaches,
that monopoly power is far more easily exercised by larger,
economically more powerful entities against smaller,
economi&lly punier ones, than vice versa.
Also of significance is the government's concession that
Syufy was only a monopsonist, not a mon~polist.~
Thus, the

4.
Monopsony is defined as a "market situation in which there is a single
buyer or a group of buyers making joint decisions. Monopsony and monopsony
power are the equivalent on the buying side of monopoly and monopoly power on
the selling side." R. Lipsey, P. Steiner & D. Purvis, Economics 976 (7th ed. 1984).
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government argues that Syufy had market power, but that it
exercised this power only against its suppliers (film
distributors), not against its consumers (moviegoers). This is
consistent with the record, which demonstrates that Syufy
always treated moviegoers fairly: The movie tickets, popcorn,
nuts
-and the Seven-Ups cost about the same in Las Vegas as in
other, comparable markets. While it is theoretically possible to
have a middleman who is a monopolist upstream but not
downstream, this is a somewhat counterintuitive scenario.
Why, if he truly had significant market power, would Raymond
Syufy have chosen to take advantage of the
movie
distributors while giving a fair shake to ordinary people? And
why do the distributors, the alleged victims of the
monopolization scheme, think that Raymond Syufy is the best
thing that ever happened to the Las Vegas movie market?
The answers to these questions are significant because,
like all antitrust cases, this one must make economic sense. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 594 n.19, 596-97, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 1360 n.19,
1361-62, 89 L.Ed 2d 538 (1986). Keeping in mind that
competition, not government intervention, is the touchstone of
a healthy, vigorous economy, we proceed to examine whether
the district court erred in concluding that Syufy does not, in
fact, hold monopoly power. There is universal agreement that
monopoly power is the power to exclude competition or control
prices. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391, 76 S.Ct 994, 1004, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956); Syufy
Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 993 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 876, 93 L.Ed.
2d 830 (1987). The district court determined that Syufy
possessed neither power. As the government's case stands or
falls with these propositions, the parties have devoted much of
their analysis to these findings. So do we.

I . Power to Exclude Competition
I t is true, of course, that when Syufy acquired Mann's,
Plitt's and Cragin's theatres he temporarily diminished the
number of competitors in the Las Vegas first-run film market.
But this does not necessarily indicate foul play; many legitimate market arrangements diminish the number of competitors. It would be odd if they did not, as the nature of competi-
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tion is to make winners and 10sers.~If there are no significant
barriers to entry, however, eliminating competitors will not
enable the survivors to reap a monopoly profit; any attempt to
raise prices above the competitive level will lure into the market new competitors able and willing to offer their commercial
goods or personal services for less. See Metro Mobile CTS, Inc.
v. New Vector Cornnun., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989).
Time after time, we have recognized this basic fact of economic life:
A high market share, though it may ordinarily raise an inference of monopoly power, will not do so in a market with low
entry barriers or other evidence of a defendant's inability to
control prices or exclude competitors.

Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360,
366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
109 S.Ct. 180 102
L.Ed.2d 149 (1988) (citation omitted). See also Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981) ("Blind reliance upon
a
market share, divorced from commercial reality, [can]
misleading picture of a firm's actual ability to control prices or
exclude c~mpetition.").~There is nothing m a ~ cabout this
proposition; it is simple common sense, embodied in the Antitrust Division's own Merger Guidelines:
If entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors

5.
See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 41 608e, a t 20-21 (1978); L.
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 8 34, at 96 (1977). Given this reality,
it would be perverse to expect rivals engaged in head on competition to act like
best friends; indeed, it would be cause for suspicion if they did.
6.
We have previously held that a district court acts within the legitimate
scope of its discretion in determining that evidence of a high market share establishes a prima facie antitrust violation, shifting to the defendant the burden of
rebutting the prima facie violation. See California u. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d
837, 842 (9th Cir. 1989), reversed on other grounds, - U.S. ,
110 S.Ct. 1853,
LO9 L.Ed. 2d 240 (1990). The converse is not true, however; evidence of a high
market share does not require a district court to conclude that there is an antitrust violation. In fact, such a conclusion normally should not be drawn where the
evidence also indicates that there is no barrier to entry into the relevant market.
See Oahu
Seru., Inc. u. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988); accord American
Stores, 872 F.2d a t 842 ("An absence of entry barriers into a market constrains
anticompetitive conduct, irrespective of the market's degree of concentration."). The
explanation is simple; where entry barriers are low, market share does not accurately reflect the party's market power. United States u. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743
F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984).
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could not succeed in raising price for any significant period of
time, the Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in that
market.

Antitrust Policies and Guidelines, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger
Guidelines 5 3.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) qI
13,103 a t 20,562 (1988).
The district court, after taking testimony from a dozen and
a half witnesses and examining innumerable graphs, charts,
statistics and other exhibits, found that there were no barriers
to entry in the Las Vegas movie market. Our function is narrow: we must determine whether that finding is clearly erroneous. See Oahu Gus, 838 F.2d a t 363, 367. Our review of the
record discloses that the district court's finding is amply supported by the record.
We bypass as surplusage the hundreds of pages of expert
and lay testimony that support the district court's finding, and
focus instead only on a single-to our minds conclusive-item.
Immediately after Syufy bought out the last of his three competitors in October 1984, he was riding high, having captured
100% of the first-run film market in Las Vegas. But this u t o ~ i a
proved to be only a mirage. That same month, a major movie
distributor, Orion, stopped doing business with Syufy, sending
all of its first-run films to Roberts Company, a dark horse competitor previously relegated to the second-run market.' Roberts
Company took this as a n invitation to step into the maior
league and, against all odds, began giving Syufy serious competition in the first-run market. Fighting fire with fire, Roberts
opened three multiplexes within a 13-month period, each having six or more screens. By December 1986, Roberts was operating 28 screens, trading places with Syufy, who had only 23.
At the same time, Roberts was displaying a healthy portion of
all fust-run films. In fact, Roberts got exclusive exhibition
rights to many of its films, meaning that Sy&y could not show
them a t all.
By the end of 1987, Roberts was showing a larger percentage of first-run films than was the Redrock multiplex a t the

7. Second-run films are the same as first-run films, only older. When a film is
initially released for public exhibition, it is in its first run. Once public demand for
the film has fallen off (but usually before it is reduced to a dead calm), the fwstrun theatre will ship it out to make room for something more recent. The film
may then open elsewhere in the same area, usually at a lower ticket price, this
being the film's second run.
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time Syufy bought it. Roberts then sold its theatres to United
Artists, the largest theatre chain in the countw, and Syufy
continued losing ground. It all boils down to this: Syufy's acquisitions did not short circuit the operation of the natural market
forces; Las Vegas' first-run film market was more competitive
when this case came to trial than before Syufy bought out
Mann, Plitt and Cragin.'
The Justice Department correctly points out that Syufy
still has a large market share, but attributes far too much importance to this fact.' In evaluating monopoly power, it is not
8.
The government argues that the distrid court's finding that "Roberts was a
successful competitor of Syufy in Las Vegas," United States v. Syufy Enters., 712
F.Supp. 1386, 1393 (N.D.Ca1. 1989) (emphasis added), is clearly erroneous because
i t conflicts with a stipulation that "Roberts was not a n effective competitor." United
States v. Syufy Enters., No. C-86-3057-WHO a t 6 (N.D.Ca1. Nov. 3, 1988) (Stipulated Fads) (emphasis added). We see no reason to resolve this semantic squabble.
The stipulation on which the government relies goes on to state that "Roberts
expanded its operation in Las Vegas from five screens in 1983 to 28 screens in
1987." Id. I t is this f a d that colors our conclusion, not the particular adjective
selected by the parties or by the district court.
The stipulation-even if read as the government suggests-does not undermine
the district court's separate findings that United Artists, Roberts' successor, "competes vigorously with Syufy, a substantially smaller chain," that UA is "much more
successfil than was Roberts because of its substantial 'clout' with distributors," and
that UA could, if it wished to, compete with Syufy even more vigorously. 712
F.Supp. a t 1394. All of this amply supports the distrid court's determination that
Syufy faces substantial competition.
The government also challenges the district court's definition of the relevant
9.
upstream product market in Las Vegas. The court defined the market broadly to
include not only first-run theatrical exhibition, but also "exhibition on home video,
cable television, and pay-per-view television." 712 F.Supp. at 1389. We agree with
the government that this is not the proper market definition in examining Syufy's
power over film distributors. While moviegoers may well view these alternative
methods of film exhibition as readily substitutable, film distributors do not. Distributors use first-run theatrical exhibition to make sure that audiences are exposed to
a film so that, even if it gets bad reviews and fails to turn a profit in theatres,
people switch in^ channels or checking out videos will recognize the title and be
induced by its fame to watch it. That first-run theatrical exhibition enhances a
film's performance in auxiliary markets does not mean that auxiliary markets can
substitute for theatrical release. The district court was therefore mistaken in
relying on testimony that "of the 578 films produced in 1987, 214 were released on
home video and not in the theatres," id. a t 1400, as there was no suggestion that
any of these 214 films were suitable for theatrical release, or that any film has
ever been released first on home video and then later played in first-run theaters.
Jane Fonda's Low Impact Aerobic Workout may be a best-selling videocassette, but
it is unlikely to be the hit a t a local movie theatre.
The district court's erroneous definition of the relevant upstream product
market does not warrant reversal, however. The district court repeatedly made
alternative findings using the government's narrower market definition limited
solely to first-run exhibition. Our review of the record convinces us that these
alternative findings are supported by substantial evidence.
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market share that counts, but the ability t o maintain market
share. See Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 366. Syufy seems unable to
do this. In 1985, Syufy managed to lock up exclusive exhibition
rights t o 91% of all the first-run films in Las Vegas. By the
first quarter of 1988, that percentage had fallen to 39%;United
Artists had exclusive rights to another %%, with the remaining 36%being played on both Syufy and UA screens.
Syufy's share of box office receipts also dropped off, albeit
less precipitously.2 In 1985, Syufy raked in 93% of the gross
box office from first-run films in Las Vegas. By the first quarter
of 1988, that figure had fallen t o 75%. The government insists
that 75% is still a large number, and we are hard pressed to
disagree; but that's not the point. The antitrust laws do not
require that rivals compete in a dead heat, only that neither is
unfairly kept from doing his personal best. Accordingly, the
government would do better to plot these points on a graph and
observe the pattern they form than t o focus narrowly on
Syufy's market share at a particular time. The numbers reveal
that RobertsNA has steadily been eating away at Syufy's market share: In two and a half years, Sydy's percentage of exclusive exhibition rights dropped 52% and its percentage of box
office receipts dropped 18%. During the same period,
10.
The district court was entitled to rely on any of several indicia of Syufy's
market share, including its percentage of first-run films, its percentage of first-run
playdates and its percentage of gross box office receipts. As each of these indices
points in the same direction-toward Syufy's decreasing market share-we fail to
understand what the government hopes to gain by arguing that box office receipts
are the only meaningful indicator of market share.
I n any event, we are unable to agree with the government on this issue. By
focusing exclusively on box office receipts, the government attributes to Syufy a
prescience he does not possess. No one, not even Syufy, can accurately predict how
every movie will do a t the box office. As demonstrated by the large number of
busted guarantees, exhibitors in Las Vegas often had great expectations for fdms
that eventually disappeared without a trace. That does not necessarily mean that
the films were bad or that the theatres that played them did not want them very
much; i t simply means that the exhibitor did not have perfect foresight. Thus, for
example, the government stepped out of bounds in disparaging Powwow Highway.
See Reply Brief for Appellant at 7-8 n. 7. While somewhat off beat, the film
garnered terrific reviews and captured the Filmmakers Trophy a t the Sundance
United States Film Festival in Park City, Utah. LA Times, Jan. 31, 1989, a t VI-7,
col. 4. Film critic Sheila Benson described it as "a little zinger of a comedy with a
rare backbone of intelligence"; "a pretty irresistible movie . . . that fixes [itself]
permanently in our affections." LA Times, March 17, 1989, a t VI-1, col. 2, VI-16,
col. 1. See also L. Maltin, Leonard Maltin's TV Movies & Video Guide 206 (1989).
Reviews this good are not common; some theatre operators, seeing that a movie
had become the critic's choice, might well be willing to go for the longshot rather
than the sure thing.
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RobertsKJA's newly opened theatres evolved from absolute beginners, barely staying alive, into a big business."
The government concedes that there are no structural barriers to entry into the market: Syufy does not operate a bank or
similar enterprise where entry is limited by government regulation or licensing requirements. Nor is this the type of industry, like heavy manufacturing or mining, which requires onerous front-end investments that might deter competition from
all but the hardiest and most financially secure investors.12
See R. Posner, supra p. 663, a t 290. Nor do we have here a
business dependent on a scarce commodity, control over which
might give the incumbent a substantial structural advantage.
Nor is there a network of exclusive contracts or distribution
arrangements designed to lock out potential competitors. To the
contrary, the record discloses a rough-and-tumble industry,
marked by easy market access, fluid relationships with distributors, an ample and continuous supply of product, and a
healthy and growing demand.13 It would be difficult to design

11. The Antitrust Division's Merger Guidelines adopt a two-year test in determining whether there are barriers to entry i n a market: if successful entry is
likely within two years, there are no significant entry barriers, and the government
will not challenge mergers in that market. Merger Guidelines $ 3.3, reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ql 13,103 at 20,562 (1988). Had the government applied the
two-year test here, it surely would not have pursued this suit against Syufy. The
critical acquisition occurred in October 1984; by December 1986, Roberts had not
only successfidly entered the market, it was operating five more first-run screens
than was Syufjr.
12. The Justice Department argues that it is expensive to build a multiplex,
but the district court was rightly unimpressed by this contention. Syufy was
neither the first nor the last to open a multiplex in Las Vegas: Cragin's 11-screen
Redrock was there before Syufy came into t h e market and, sbon thereafter, Roberts
opened three multiplexes in -quick succession. In fact, Roberts was spared the
expense of construction, as several of its theatres were financed by shopping center
developers from whom Roberts later leased space. See RT 2:254-55, 2:261, 2:272-73,
2:278-79.
The Justice Department claims that the district court misunderstood the
13.
evidence on this point. It argues that Las Vegas is "overscreened," i-e., that potential competitors declined to enter the market because there was not enough business to go around. The district court made detailed contrary findings: The rule of
thumb in the film industry is that it takes 10,000 people to support one screen.
Las Vegas is populated by approximately 600,000 residents and 100,000 tourists a t
any given time, leaving room for as many as 70 screens. Yet, at the time of trial,
there were only 50 first-run screens in the city, meaning that the Las Vegas
market offered ample opportunities to potential entrants. In addition, Las Vegas is
a boom town, growing at the rate of 30,000 people a year. Thus, the potential for
new entry into the first-run film market will continue. RT 2:300, 3:338, 6:989.
"Because untapped potential provides a mouth-watering incentive for vigorous
competition, it is axiomatic that monopoly power is unlikely to arise in dynamic
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a market less susceptible to monopolization.
Confronted with this record and the district court's clear
findings, the government trots out a shopworn argument we
had thought long abandoned: that efficient, aggressive competition is itself a structural barrier to entry. According to the government, competitors will be deterred from entering the market
because they could not hope to turn a profit competing against
Syufy. In the words of government counsel:
There is no legal barrier. There is no law that says you can't
come into this market, it's not that kind of barrier . . . . But,
the fact of mere possibility in the literal sense, is not the
appropriate test. Entry, after all, must, to be effective to dissipate the monopoly power that Syufy has, entry must hold
some reasonable prospect of profitability for the entrant, or
else the entrant will say, a s Mann Theatres said . . . this is
not an attractive market to enter. There will be shelter. And
the reason is very clear. You have to compete effectively in
this market. And witness after witness testified you would
need to build anywhere from 12 to 24 theatres, which is a
very expensive and time consuming proposition. And, you
would then find yourself in a bidding war against Syufy.

Tr.of Oral Arg. a t 5 (emphasis added).
The notion that the supplier of a good or service can monopolize the market simply by being efficient reached high tide
industries marked by a rapidly expanding volume of demand and low barriers to
entry." Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. u. New Vector Commun., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th
Cir. 1989).
More fundamentally, the government's static model, which assumes that there
is only so much demand for a particular product, is alien to modern economic
theory, a s well as common sense, which teach us that things change. The demand
for movie tickets can fluctuate with a variety of factors such as price, quality of
the movie theatre, cost of related goods such as concession stand products, and
quality of films shown. Even assuming that the Las Vegas movie market was, in
some static sense, operating a t capacity, the entry of a new competitor might, as
the district court found, simply result in "the exit of some of the less attractive
and less efficient theatres in Las Vegas." 712 F.Supp. a t 1396. Or, a new competitor with high hopes might price movie tickets lower, increase advertising, provide
more convenient parking facilities, or otherwise induce people to go to the movies
more often. Or, a theatre operator might hit the jackpot by catering to parents of
small children who might be more likely to patronize drive-in theatres. We cannot
and should not speculate as to the details of a potential competitor's performance;
we need only determine whether there were barriers to the entry of new faces into
the market. As we discuss in greater detail below, in making that determination
we are not concerned with whether, once in the market, the competitor will wind
up doing well. The thing to remember is that doing business in the crucible of free
enterprise is inherently unpredictable.
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in the law 44 years ago in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
United States u. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).14 In the intervening decades the wisdom of this notion
has been questioned by just about everyone who has taken a
close look a t it. See, e.g., MCI Commun. Corp. u. AT&T, 708
F.2d 1081, 1107-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891, 104
S.Ct 234, 78 L.Ed 2d 226 (1983); 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra n. 5, ¶ 608e, at 22 ("It is absurd to classify such behavior
as unlawfully 'exclusionary."); L. Sullivan, supra n. 5, a t 103
('The Hand formulation . . . fails to clearly identify the differences between guilty and innocent conduct."). It has been
soundly repudiated by the Second Circuit. See Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,273-74 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093, 100 S.Ct. 1061, 62 L.Ed. 2d 783
(1980).
The argument government counsel presses here is a close
variant of Alcoa: The government is not claiming that Syufy
monopolized the market by being too efficient, but that Syufy's
effectiveness as a competitor creates a structural barrier to
entry, rendering illicit Syufy's acquisition of its competitors'
screens. We hasten to sever this new branch that the government has caused to sprout from the moribund Alcoa trunk.
It can't be said often enough that the antitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors. As we noted earlier, competition
is essential to the effective operation of the free market because
it encourages efliciency, promotes consumer satisfaction and

14. In Alcoa, Judge Hand concluded that defendant corporation violated the
antitrust laws simply by making all the right moves, in particular, by filling the
demand of which it was the creator:
True, it stimulated demand and opened new uses for the metal, but not
without making sure that it could supply what it had evoked . . . .
"Alcoa" avows it as evidence of the skill, energy and initiative with which
it has always conducted its business; as a reason why, having won its
way by fair means, it should be commended, and not dismembered . . . .
[We] may assume that all it claims for itself is true . . . . [But ilt was
not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand
for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. I t
insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as
it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared
into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel . . . . That was to "monopolize" that
market, however innocently it otherwise proceeded.
F.2d a t 430-32.
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prevents the accumulation of monopoly profits. When a producer is shielded from competition, he is likely to provide lesser
service a t a higher price; the victim is the consumer who gets a
raw deal. This is the evil the antitrust laws are meant to avert.
But when a producer deters competitors by supplying a better
product a t a lower price, when he eschews monopoly profits,
when he operates his business so as to meet consumer demand
and increase consumer satisfaction, the goals of competition are
served, even if no actual competitors see fit to enter the market
a t a particular time. While the successful competitor should not
be raised above the law, neither should he be held down by
law.
The Supreme Court has accordingly distanced itself from
the Alcoa legacy. taking care to distinguish unlawful monopoly
power from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident," United
States u. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1704,
16 L.Ed. 2d 778 (1966), which is off limits to the enforcer of our
antitrust laws. If a dominant supplier acts consistent with a
competitive market-out of fear perhaps that potential competitors are ready and able to step in-the purpose of the antitrust
laws is amply served. We make it clear today, if it was not
before, that an efficient, vigorous, aggressive competitor is not
the villain antitrust laws are aimed at eliminating. Fostering
an environment where businesses fight it out using the weapon
of efficiency and consumer goodwill is what the antitrust laws
are meant to champion. As the Second Circuit has said: 'We
fail to see how the existence of good will achieved through
effective service is a n impediment to, rather than the natural
result of, competition." United States u. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743
F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1984).
But we need not rely on theory alone in rejecting the
government's argument. The record here conclusively demonstrates that neither acquiring the screens of his competitors
nor working hard at better serving the public gave Syufy deliverance from competition. Immediately following the disappearance of M a n . , Plitt and Cragin, Roberts took up the challenge,
aggressively competing with Syufy for first-run films-and with
considerable success. United Artists, with substantial resources
a t its disposal and nationwide experience in running movie
theatres, considered the market sufficiently open that it bought
out Roberts in 1987. We see no indication that competition
suffered in the Las Vegas movie market as a result of Syufy's

-
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challenged acquisitions.15 The district court certainly had ample basis in the record for its finding that Syufy lacked the
power to exclude competitors. Indeed, on this voluminous record we are hard-pressed to see how the district court could
have come to the other conclusion.
2. Power to Control Prices

The crux of the Justice Department's case is that Syufy,
top gun in the Las Vegas movie market, had the power to push
around Hollywood's biggest players, dictating to them what
prices they could charge for their movies. The district court
found otherwise. This finding too has substantial support in the
record.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of Syufy's inability to set
prices came from movie distributors, Syufy's supposed victims.
At the trial, distributors uniformly proclaimed their satisfaction
with the way the Las Vegas first-run film market operates;
none complained about the license fees paid by Syufy.
Columbia's President of Domestic Distribution testified that
"Syufy paid a fair amount of film rental" that compared favor:
ably with other markets. RT 5:715. A representative of Buena
Vista, a division of Disney, testified that Syufy had never refused to accept its standard terms. RT 6:924. Particularly damaging to the government's case was the testimony of the former
head of distribution for MGMlUA that his company "never had
any difficulty . . . in acquiring the terms that we thought were
reasonable," RT 6:888, explaining that the license fees Syufy
paid "were comparable or better than any place in the United
States. And in most cases better." RT 6:911. Indeed, few if any

15. The government points out that the interiors of United Artists' theatres
what sinister inference
were not as luxurious as those of Syufy. We have no
the government would have us draw 'from this fact. As the district court noted,
"No one stopped United Artists from remodeling Roberts7 theatres after it acquired
them. As the largest exhibitor in the nation, it certainly has the resources to do
so." 712 F.Supp. at 1402. Competitors need not provide a perfectly undifferentiated
product in order to be competitive; it is a strength of our free market economy
that competitors often provide products that cater to the varied tastes and preferences of consumers. Syufy made a business decision to invest in luxury theatres
while Roberts and United Artists apparently decided to dispose of their profits in
some other fashion. I t remains to be seen which strategy will ultimately prevail.
Indeed, it is not a winner take all situation; in a free market, any number can
play and any number can win. We therefore agree with the district court's refusal
to conclude that this difference in business strategies was a n indication of market
failure.
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of the distributors were willing to say anything to support the
government's claim.
The documentary evidence bears out this testimony. Syufy
has at all times paid license fees far in excess of the national
average, even higher than those paid by exhibitors in Los Angeles, the Mecca of Moviedom. In fact, Syufy paid a higher
percentage of his gross receipts to distributors in 1987 and
1988 than he did during the intensely competitive period just
before he acquired Cragin's Redrock?
While successful, Syufy is in no position to put the squeeze
on distributors. The one time he tried there was a n immediate
backlash. In 1984, about seven days after allegedly acquiring
its monopoly, Syufy informed Orion Releasing Group that he
had cold feet about The Cotton Club and would not honor the
large guarantees he had contracted for, only to see his gambit
backfire. Orion sued Syufy for breach of contract, see Orion
Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enters., 829 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.
1987), licensed the film to Roberts and cut Syufy off cold turkey. To this day, Orion refuses to play its films in any Syufy
theatre, in Las Vegas or elsewhere. 712 F.Supp. at 1393. Accordingly, Syufy lost the opportunity to exhibit top moneymakers like Robocop, Platoon, Hannah and Her Sisters and No
Way Out.'? The district court found no evidence that Orion
considered RobertsLJA's theatres a less than adequate substitute for Syufy's. Id.
Because he needs plenty of first-run films to fill his many
screens (22 at the time of trial; 34 now), Syufy is vulnerable.
Distributors like Orion have substantial leverage over Syufy.
and they know it. One witness, the President of Domestic Distribution for Columbia, testified at length about the power he
and other distributors wield over Syufy:

16. The government argues that the district court erred in finding this earlier
level of competition to be "unhealthy." 712 F.Supp. at 1394. While we agree, we
need not reverse because of the insignificance of the error. The erroneous finding
was relevant to only one of three elements needed to prove the government's
attempted monopolization claim. As the government was unable to demonstrate
that Syufy had the power to control prices or to exclude competition, it cannot
prevail even though we disregard the district court's finding of unhealthy competition.
17. The list of Orion films that played exclusively at Roberts theaters also
includes such popular fare as Amadeus, Back to School, Bull Durham, Colors,
Hoosiers, Married to the Mob, Radio Days and the unforgettable Throw Momma
From the Train.
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. . . [With] Sy&y having 23 first-run screens, he could not
get into a two and a half percent fight with Columbia; he had
so many mouths to feed in those theatres, that he was more
or less compelled to pay national suggested terms for films.
....
. . . He could have tried

[to dictate terms], but he wouldn't
have gotten away with it, your Honor. He was very vulnerable. My point is that he was very vulnerable in that market.
He could not-he needed the flow of product to fill those
screens, and to take on-to get into a fight with the distributor over terms, or film rentals paid to a distributor, would
create an attitude where we could sell [to] his opposition and
he'd be egregiously hurt.
.

.

a

.

...

[He] was his own competition, your Honor. He had created such a large amount of screens that he was-he was
himself-he was himself vulnerable. As I described before, if
he would have pressed, and if he would have come to Jimmie
Spitz and said, "I'm not going t6 pay you this percentage for
the film," I would have said, "Fine, Ray, we'll stay out of the
marketplace." He couldn't afford-he has to-he has to have
film in his theatres. And that's the leverage that this company had with Mr. Syufy.

RT 5:714-16 (testimony of James Spitz).
After hours of such testimony, the judge quite rightly concluded that Syufy did not have the power t o control license
fees. This evidence, moreover, reveals the trap in the oftmade
assumption that, by virtue of being a leviathan, a company will
automatically have the power to wield a big stick with which to
push around suppliers, customers and competitors. While size
no doubt provides significant business advantages, it can also
have very substantial drawbacks, such as increased management costs and other diseconomies of scale.''
More fundamentally, in a free economy the market itself
imposes a tough enough discipline on all market actors, large
and small. Every supplier of goods and services is integrated
into an endless chain of supply and demand relationships,
making it dependent on the efficiency and goodwill of upstream

18. See generally A. Alchian & W. Men, University Economics 270, 301 (1964);
2 P. Areeda & D. 'l'urner, supra n. 5, 8 407b, at 286-87; R. Posner, supra p. 663,
at 318 n. 2, 368. In business, as elsewhere in life, it is sometimes true that the
bigger they are, the harder they fall.
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suppliers, as well as the patronage of customers. Absent structural constraints that keep competition from performing its
levelling function, few businesses can dictate terms t o customers or suppliers with impunity. It's risky business even to try.
As Syufy learned in dealing with Orion and his other suppliers,
a larger company often is more vulnerable t o a squeeze play
than a smaller one. It is for that reason that neither size nor
market share alone suffice to establish a monopoly. Without
the power t o exclude competition, large companies that try t o
throw their weight around may find themselves sitting ducks
for leaner, hungrier competitors. Or, as Syufy saw, the tactic
may boomerang, causing big trouble with suppliers.
On this record, we have no basis for overturning the district court's finding that Syufy lacked the power to set the
prices he paid his suppliers. As with the district court's finding
as to Syufy's power t o exclude competition, we believe the record here lent itself t o only one sensible con~lusion.'~
3. Additional Considerations

Undeterred by the district court's carefully crafted 45 page
opinion, the government sets out a variety of other content i o n ~ We
. ~ ~have dealt with the principal ones during the
course of our discussion and the rest are largely beside the
point. By finding that Syufy did not possess the power to set
19. The Justice Department throws out a volley of numbers which, it claims,
show that Syufy managed to depress license fees after buying out his competitors.
The government attributes the lower fees to the exercise of monopoly power, but it
is mistaken. The percentage of box office receipts paid to movie distributors rises
and falls due to a combination of factors; it is 'not an accurate measure of the
competitiveness of the market.
For example, in 1985, Syufy paid Universal a very low license fee (48.1%). The
fact is, however, Syufy paid more money to Universal that year. than in any other
from 1983 to 1988. The percentage only looks low because, in 1985, Universal
released the hugely successful Back to the Future. The film played in Syufy's firstrun theatres for more than six months; the longer a film's run, th; lower the
percentage of gross receipts payable to the distributor. Thus, the low percentage
rate was based on factors other than monopoly power, as the district court quite
reasonably found. Support is missing in the record foi* the Justice Department's
theory of a shakedown by a ruthless predator.
20.
Among them are the following: (1) the district court misdefined the relevant
market; (2) the court did not understand that this was a monopsony case; (3) the
court erred in looking beyond Syufy's large market share; (4) the court mistakenly
looked a t the number of first-run movies shown as indicative of market share; (5)
the court was wrong to call the preacquisition level of competition "unhealthy"; (6)
aggressive competition is itself a barrier to entry; (7) Las Vegas is "overscreened";
and (8) RobertdUnited Artists7 theatres are not as luxurious as Syufy's.
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prices or to exclude competition, the district court removed the
k i n g pins from the government's litigation arsenal. Without
these essential elements, it can make out a violation of neither
the Sherman nor Clayton Acts; its lawsuit collapses like a
house of ~ a r d s . ~ '
It is a tribute to the state of competition in America that
the Antitmst Division of the Department of Justice has found
no worthier target than this paper tiger on which to expend
limited taxpayer resources.22 Yet we cannot help but wonder
whether bringing a lawsuit like this, and pursuing it doggedly
through 27 months of pretrial proceedings, about two weeks of

Absent any power to exclude competition, the goverment cannot prevail on
21.
its claim of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as that requires a
showing that Syufy possesses monopoly power. Similarly, the attempted monopolization claim fails because the government cannot show that there was a dangerous
probability that Syufy would succeed in destroying competition. Finally, the lack of
entry barriers prevents the government from prevailing on its Clayton Act claim,
as Syufy's acquisition of its competitors was not likely to substantially lessen
competition.
In his concurrence, Judge Quackenbush complains that our focus on the lack of
entry barriers is too narrow; he lists other factors that ought to be considered.
Concurrence at 673. While we agree that these other factors are relevant, as
explained in the preceding paragraph, the total lack of entry barriers in Las Vegas
determines the outcome of these factors in this case: Because others easily could
(and did) enter the market successfully, Syufy lacked "the ability to maintain
[market] share, the power to control prices, [and] the capability of excluding
competitors." Id.
Judge Quackenbush suggests that, under our holding, no one having "less than
100 percent of market share" could ever have a monopoly "since the existence of
competitors in the market would apparently establish the lack of barriers to entry."
Concurrence at 674. We respectfully disagree. Entry barriers pertain not to those
already in the market, but to those who would enter but are prevented from doing
so. See Merger Guidelines $ 3.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) ql 13,103 a t
20,562 (1988) (focusing on difficulty of "entry into a market"). Thus, a market
containing two firms, each having a 50% share, could well be deemed monopolistic
if entry barriers prevented other firms from gaining a foothold.
22.
The concurrence disputes our benign characterization of Syufy, relying
largely on his conduct in another market. Concurrence a t 674. As a general matter, we do not agree with this logic. Antitrust violations must be judged on a
market-by-market basis. That Syufy may have been guilty of some impropriety in
the past would not justify the government's decision to pursue a drawn-out legal
battle as to his conduct in Las Vegas unless there was substantial evidence of
wrongdoing in Las Vegas.
In any event, Syufy Enters. u. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 876, 93 L.Ed. 2d 830 (1987), on
which Judge Quackenbush relies, does not support his point; rather, it supports
ours. In American Multicinema, we reversed an antitrust jury verdict against Syufy
for insufficient evidence. See 793 F.2d at 1001-03. Given the infrequency with
which we reverse jury verdicts, the Antitrust Division might have considered this,
if a t all, as a sign that Syufy was not the evildoer he was made out to be.
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trial and now the full distance on appeal, really serves the
interests of free competition.
The record here demonstrates in graphic detail that Syufy's
entry into the Las Vegas first-run movie market resulted in a
vast improvement for movie distributors and consumers alike.
By all accounts, Raymond Syufy's theatres are among the finest
built and best run in the nation, making him somewhat of a
local hero. At the same time, movie distributors have nothing
but praise for Syufy, as his being there has invigorated theatre
attendance in Las Vegas, substantially driving up their revenues. As is often the case when a vigorous competitor enters
the market, more complacent theatre operators were eliminated, but there was no credible evidence that Syufy did anything
improper to drive them out. 712 F.Supp. a t 1390-91. Indeed, by
buying them out, Syufy may well have helped cushion the losses they would have suffered had they been required to sell the
theatres a t fire sale prices or leave them abandoned.
What then was the problem the government sought to
solve by bringing this lawsuit? At oral argument, the lawyer for
the government explained it thus:
[Basically] if you drive down by anti-competitive conduct the
price at which theatre owners buy film licenses, then there
will be less [films] ultimately produced, because there will be
a distortion in the natural market in the competitive forces,
and people who go to movies like you and me would ultimately have less choice.

Tr. of Oral Arg. a t 9. It is, we suppose, not out of the question
that what Raymond Syufy and other local theatre operators do
in their respective markets could stem the avalanche of movies
that comes to us out of Hollywood every year. Yet movie distributors are not exactly a powerless lot, likely to surrender h
first time they are presented with hard choices by a theatre
operator; nor are they reluctant to precipitate a showdown
when they believe their rights are being infringed.23 And, as
we have seen, the market has its own failsafe mechanisms.
Where the government inserts an antitrust enforcement action

23.
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.,
866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989), Orion Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enters., 829
F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1987); ltventieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d
1327 (9th Cir. 1983), Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621
F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1980).
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into this type of situation, there is a real danger of stifling
competition and creativity in the marketplace.
It is well known that some of the most insuperable barriers
in the meat race of competition are the result of government
regulation. Regulation often helps entrench existing businesses
by placing new entrants at a competitive disadvantage. It is
perhaps less well appreciated that litigation itself can be a
form of regulation; lawsuits brought by the government impose
significant costs on enterprises that are sued, and create significant disincentives for those that are not.
In this case, the government was suspicious because Syufy
bought out the movie theatres of his retreating competitors.
But, in a competitive market, buying out competitors is not
merely permissible, it contributes to market stability and promotes the efficient allocation of resources. The fact is, a relentless, growing competitor is frequently the most logical buyer of
a business that is declining. For competitors in a free market to
fear buying each other out lest they be hit with the expense
and misery of an antitrust enforcement action amounts to a
burden only slightly less palpable than a direct governmental
In a free enterprise sysprohibition against such a pur~hase.'~
tem decisions such as these should be made by market actors
responding to market forces, not by government bureaucrats
pursuing their notions of how the market should operate. Personal initiative, not government control, is the fountainhead of
progress in a capitalist economy.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

24.
We are aware, of course, that even in a monopoly situation competitors
may buy each other out where the selling company is failing. See United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507, 94 S.Ct. 1186, 39 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1974);
F. & M. Schaefer Corp. u. C. Schmdt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817-18 (2d Cir.
1979). But establishing a failing company defense is not easy; a competitor must
be in critical condition to be subject to acquisition under that doctrine. In a competitive market, however, there is no need to rely on a failing company defense,
and the ability to buy out competitors who are merely ailing may well promote
market efficiency, enhance consumer welfare and foster competition.

